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  Our work tries to assess the degree to which the matching process of the vacancies managed 
by the Andalusian public employment agencies (SAE) approaches a theoretical model of the stock-
flow type as described by Coles (1994, CEPR) and his collaborators. According to this model, a 
new vacancy can be "good" (relatively scarce in its labour segment) or "bad" (relatively abundant in 
its labour segment); this unobservable heterogeneity at the aggregate level determines the 
probability of coverage of the vacancy and the characteristics of the worker who occupies it. For 
our study, we work with a sample of 3.565 vacancies registered in the SAE between March 2006 
and October 2008. The proposed test requires the estimation of a duration model for the hazard rate 
of vacancies with multiple exits. A novelty of our test is that it does not require information about 
the entire stock and flow of candidates of the other side of the market. The main result obtained is 
the existence of certain evidence in favour of stock-flow matching. 
 
JEL codes: J63, J64. 
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When the underlying microfoundation of any process of labour matching is analysed, it is 
possible to distinguish at least between two extreme theoretical scenarios: random matching and 
stock-flow matching
1. In the first model, the participants in the market are heterogeneous, and the 
available information to search for the matching is incomplete, because every individual has to 
select vacancies randomly until finding a suitable one; in this scenario, in every round of matching, 
a worker will try to fill some existing vacancy, either from the stock of vacancies that exists at the 
beginning of the period or from the new vacancies that are entering the market during the period. 
With respect to the stock-flow model, the available information is perfect, but there exists at least a 
type of heterogeneity that can slow down the matching process: the labour market is divided into 
different segments that are unconnected and differentiated by the characteristics required from the 
worker and from the vacancy to be able to form a suitable job placement. 
 
In this work, which is built on that of Álvarez de Toledo et al. (2008) but from a 
microeconomic perspective
2, we will try to test by means of the estimation of a duration model for 
the vacancies managed by the Andalusian Employment Agency (SAE)
3 to what degree their 
matching process responds to a theoretical model of the stock-flow type as described by Coles 
(1994). According to this model, a new vacancy can be "good" or "bad". In this way, a "good" 
vacancy is one that belongs to a segment of the labour market where the vacancies do not 
accumulate -they are in the “short side” of the market- so that when this type of vacancy is 
registered, it is quickly filled with some worker from the available stock in this segment. On the 
contrary, a "bad" vacancy is one that belongs to a segment in which the vacancies and not the 
workers accumulate in the stock -the vacancies are in the “long side” of the market- so that when 
the vacancy is registered initially, there are not available workers to occupy it, and the vacancy will 
have to wait for the arrival of new workers to allow for a job placement. According to Coles (1994), 
this dynamics of flows and stocks can yield two types of matching: new vacancies (instantaneous 
flow) with old job demands (stock) and vice versa. Nevertheless, our real data do not show a 
complete fit to a stock-flow model of partially instantaneous flows, so even a "good" individual can 
go several rounds without matching. In practice, this fact means that in a certain segment there 
could coexist vacancies and workers and that we also observe matching between new vacancies and 
new job demands (flows) and between old vacancies and old job demands (stocks), although these 
job placements should always be between "good" ones and "bad" ones. 
 
In the literature of matching, it is common to estimate duration models
4 for workers in search 
of employment with the aim of analysing the influence of many covariables such as sex, age, 
education, labour experience, family characteristics, disposition towards mobility, perception of 
unemployment subsidies, and the macroeconomic environment
5. In other works, the duration 
models take into account different possible exits: permanent versus fixed-term contracts, self-
employment versus working for others, and reemployment at the same firm ("recall") versus 
                                                 
1 In practice, the matching processes in the labour markets must be at some point between both theoretical extremes. 
2 In Álvarez de Toledo et al. (2008), we tested stock-flow matching in comparison with random matching for the case 
of Spain, Andalusia and Madrid in the period 1978-2005, but we did so using aggregate data instead of individual data. 
3 In Spain, there are no databases showing vacancies in the overall economy. The best database corresponds to the 
vacancies managed by the public sector, but it only covers part of the labour market.    
4 On the methodology of the duration models, see, among others, Kiefer (1988), Lancaster (1990) and Jenkins (2005). 
5 For the case of Spain, see Andrés et al. (1989), Ahn and Ugidos (1995), García-Pérez (1997, 2006), Alba-Ramírez 
(1998, 1999), Ahn et al. (1999), Lassibille et al. (2001), Bover et al. (2002), Gonzalo (2002), Jenkins and García-
Serrano (2004), Fernández (2006), Güell and Hu (2006) and Arranz and Muro (2007). For other countries, see, for 
example, Nickell (1979) and Narendranathan and Stewart (1993) for the United Kingdom; Katz and Meyer (1990) and 
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changing between firms, among others
6. On the other hand, the duration models are much less 




In general, the duration models obtain decreasing hazard rates from relatively limited 
durations, as much for the workers in search of employment as for the vacancies, which is 
consistent with the stock-flow matching model (the lower durations correspond to workers and 
vacancies that belong to the short side of the market and vice versa). Nevertheless, there can be 
other explanations for these decreasing hazard rates, even for the side of the vacancies
8. A more 
rigorous test of the stock-flow model thus not only needs to analyse whether the hazard rate of the 
vacancies decreases with its duration, but also to control whether the matching takes place with new 
or old job demands depending on the duration of the vacancy; the reasoning for the side of the 
workers would be analogous. 
 
For our empirical analysis, we used a sample of 3.565 vacancies registered in the SAE 
between March 2006 and October 2008. This sample contains valuable information about the 
characteristics of the vacancies (group of occupation, sector of activity, province, public or private 
character, type of contract, etc.), which will allow us to control for observable heterogeneity in our 
estimations. Andalusia is an important Spanish region that is characterised by a high unemployment 
rate as well as some idiosyncratic features (Usabiaga, 2004), hence giving relevance to our case 
study. 
 
Therefore, our estimations look for a twofold objective: to determine the profile of the 
vacancies with higher and lower matching rates and to test whether the matching process of the 
vacancies of the SAE shows certain stock-flow dynamics. With regards to the latter point, we will 
take the work of Andrews et al. (2009) for the United Kingdom as the main reference at the 
methodological level, though we introduce some changes in comparison with the methodology 
proposed by these authors. An alternative method is proposed to distinguish between new and old 
vacancies and job demands, based on the change of regime in their (non-parametric) empirical 
hazard rates, compatible with the stock-flow approach. With this information, we develop our own 
stock-flow test -until now not used in this literature- which analyses the evolution, depending on the 
duration, of the ratio between two hazard rates for the vacancies towards old and new job demands. 
The advantage of this test, in comparison with the other tests available in the literature, is that it 
does not need to have any temporarily aggregated information about the evolution of the other side 
of the market; we refer to the evolution of all of the job demands (stocks and flows) that have been 
"at risk" of matching with the vacancies in every moment. The main result of our work, which 
reaffirms the results of Álvarez de Toledo et al. (2008), points towards the existence of certain 
evidence in favour of the stock-flow type of matching in the vacancies managed by the SAE, 
especially once we control for heterogeneity. As we will note later, this fact can have some 
implications on the design of employment policies and the unemployment protection system. 
 
The rest of the work is structured as follows: in section 2, we analyse the characteristics of the 
stock-flow matching model, and we refer to a version of the model that differs slightly from the 
                                                 
6 For the case of Spain see, for example, Alba-Ramírez (1994) (in comparison with the United States), Carrasco (1999), 
Bover and Gómez (2004), Cueto and Mato (2006), Alba-Ramírez et al. (2007), Güell and Petrongolo (2007), Albert et 
al. (2008) and Cebrián and Toharia (2008). 
7 In this line, we have only found the works of Andrews et al. (2008, 2009) and Coles and Smith (1998). The first 
authors use individual data (weekly aggregated) on the vacancies and the job demands registered at an employment 
agency for young persons in Lancashire (England); the second authors analyse the monthly statistics on the durations of 
the vacancies and the job demands registered at the U.K. Job Centres. 
8 An example for the side of the worker is the "stigma" effect modelled by Blanchard and Diamond (1994). For the side 
of the vacancies, the hazard rate must fall sooner or later if some vacancies observed along the period of analysis tend to 
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original (which is expressed in infinitesimal terms). In section 3, the observed durations of the 
vacancies and the job demands that cover them are analysed. Section 4 develops a new test of stock-
flow matching. In the first subsection, we propose a method to determine the maximum duration 
that a "good" vacancy and a "good" job demand remain "at risk" of matching before becoming old. 
In the second subsection, we estimate parametrically the hazard rate of the vacancies of the SAE 
while controlling for heterogeneity; we find that the observable heterogeneity is important in our 
data. In the third subsection, we confirm the existence of some stock-flow structure in our data of 
vacancies by means of the estimation of a duration model with heterogeneity and multiple exits. 
The ratio of the hazard rates is the key of our test; likewise, we will try to prove the robustness of 
our results. Finally, in section 5, the main conclusions of our work are presented. 
 
2. Methodology: the “stock-flow” matching model. 
 
Coles (1994) and Coles and Smith (1998) analyse the implications of the job search process 
when the labour market is segmented and the participants in it come to an established place or 
marketplace, such as a public employment agency, with complete information about all of the 
candidates; in this context, the firms know the available job seekers in their segment (and vice 
versa), so that at the end of every round of matching, no firm that could have covered a vacancy is 
going to remain without doing so. An important implication of the described process is that a firm 
(worker) that has not managed to form a job placement after a round of matching will not try to 
contact an already known worker again (firm)
9. 
 
The dynamics can be described in terms of stocks and the flow of unemployment and 
vacancies. At the beginning of a period, the stock of vacancies does not relate to the stock of 
workers (and vice versa), since both coexisted in the round corresponding to the previous period 
and did not result in job placement. Therefore, this process of matching is based on the fact that the 
stocks of vacancies and workers at the beginning of a period will try to match, respectively, with the 
flows of new workers and new vacancies corresponding to this period, with these flows thus leading 
the matching process. This process is denoted as stock-flow labour matching. 
 
From the origin of the stock-flow approach, the literature in this field has essentially centred 
on two aspects: the empirical testing of the model and the problem of temporal aggregation that 
arises in the empirical estimation of the matching function or of the hazard rates of the individuals 
(vacancies or workers). 
 
With regard to the empirical testing of the model, Coles and Smith (1998) and Coles and 
Petrongolo (2008) for the United Kingdom, Gregg and Petrongolo (2005) for Great Britain, and 
Álvarez de Toledo et al. (2008)
10 for Spain find evidence in favour of a stock-flow framework. 
Andrews et al. (2009) analyse individual data, though aggregated weekly, from a job placement 
office for young persons in Lancashire and report evidence in favour of the stock-flow model. All 
these works bear in mind that the estimation of matching functions or of hazard rates towards the 
employment presents a problem of temporal aggregation of the data if the time period of 
measurement of the job placements is discrete. In this way, the flow of job placements in every 
period can be generated with unemployed workers and vacancies of the respective stocks at the 
beginning of the period or with the new unemployed workers and the new vacancies that appear 
                                                 
9 This fact tries to capture a plausible characteristic of the labour markets: for example, from the side of the worker, this 
one checks the announcements of employment before deciding to contact; and if, after answering an advertisement, the 
worker is rejected, the worker will not likely contact the same firm in a later round, leaving the worker to answer only 
new advertisements. 
10 The main result obtained in this work, of the existence of a stock-flow scenario for the labour market intermediated 
by the Spanish Public Employment Agency (INEM/SPEE), is robust across time and geographical dimensions and is 
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along the period. Burdett et al. (1994) show that the estimated parameters of the conventional 
matching function -the function that has, like regressors, only the initial stocks of unemployed 
workers and vacancies- can be downwards biased, a bias that will be proportional to the extension 
of the reference period. 
 
The main implication of the stock-flow model on the matching function once we control for 
temporal aggregation consists of assuming the existence of unobservable heterogeneity in the flows, 
in the sense that in each (in terms of the flow of workers and the flow of vacancies) include "good" 
and "bad" individuals
11. The "good" individuals belong to a segment of the market where they are 
relatively scarce -they are on the short side of the market- and the "bad" ones present the 
characteristic of being relatively abundant in its segment -they are on the long side of the market. In 
the perfectly continuous version of the model, the new "good" individuals instantaneously disappear 
when they match with an individual from the existing stock of candidates, so they do not become 
old and they do not enter the stock of "bad" individuals. In a more realistic view of matching, 
placed at some point between random matching and stock-flow matching, and considering the case 
of the vacancies, for instance, we must think that even a "good" vacancy needs a certain finite 
period of search to be able to form a job placement, since the available information about suitable 
job seekers is not perfect. 
 
Let us suppose therefore that there exists a brief but finite period of time in which the "good" 
vacancies manage to be filled, which allows us to think of the model in discrete terms. This would 
mean that any "good" or short-side vacancy will match within the above mentioned period with a 
worker who is a "bad" or long-side worker, probably coming from the stock, since they are more 
abundant than "bad" candidates who have just entered the market, due to the accumulation of the 
former ones. From another perspective, the "bad" vacancies will show higher durations and higher 
variance, since they could be short or long
12, and they will go out more frequently towards new 
workers, as their duration is longer; that is, we expect that the exits towards new job demands gain 
relative weight in relation to the exits towards old or "bad" job demands when the duration of the 
vacancy increases. 
 
One of the aims of this work is to estimate empirically the typical duration of a job demand 
and of a vacancy of the SAE when they are labelled "good". 
 
3. The observed durations of the vacancies and the job demands. 
 
We now analyse the duration of the period in which the vacancies remain "at risk" of 
matching; the period since the vacancy is registered in the SAE until one of these three 
circumstances occurs: the vacancy is covered; the offer to which it belongs is closed
13; and, if those 
two things do not happen, because the period of observation ends (on October 31, 2008). We also 
analyse the complete search duration of the workers who matched those vacancies of the sample 
that were finally covered. 
 
With respect to the covered vacancies (1.722 vacancies), the mean and the median duration 
take values of 39 and 16 days, respectively, whereas durations of 10 and 14 days are the most 
frequent. The minimal duration observed for these vacancies is lower than one day, and the 
maximum duration is 305 days. The histogram in Figure 1 shows that most of the vacancies that are 
                                                 
11 For more detailed treatment of the stock-flow matching function in discrete time, see Núñez and Usabiaga (2007). 
12 In our finite time model, a "bad" vacancy might have the fortune of being covered soon by some "good" job demand, 
so this vacancy would show a short duration. On the other hand, only the "bad" individuals can become old. 
13 It is necessary to distinguish between a job offer and a vacancy in the SAE. A job offer can contain one or more 
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Duration of the vacancy (days)
Figure 1. Distribution of the complete durations. Covered vacancies.
 
                    Source: Our elaboration based on the sample.  
 
For vacancies closed by causes other than job placement, the mean duration, median duration 
and mode take values of 155,6, 117 and 131 days, respectively. The minimum duration observed is 
less than one day, and the maximum duration is 585 days. Therefore, vacancies that are closed 
without matching have longer durations, on average, than vacancies that are filled. Finally, if we 
pay attention to the vacancies that remain opened at the date of sample extraction, we observe mean 
duration, median duration and mode values of 524, 605 and 633 days, respectively. The maximum 
duration observed in this type of vacancies is 966 days, whereas the minimum duration is less than 
one day. We suggest that the relatively high durations in this group can be due to the existence of 
"false" vacancies (not real vacancies) that appear due to an administrative mismatch at the moment 
of crossing a job offer with a job demand when a job placement occurs. In this way, for example, if 
a job placement is registered without correct information about the codes of the offer, that vacancy 
would remain open until the closure of the offer in spite of having been covered. 
 
We now analyse the durations of the job demands that have been matched with the vacancies 
of the sample that were finally filled; we thus analyse complete and successful episodes of job 
demand. The mean duration of a job demand is 100 days, and the median duration and the mode 
are, respectively, 62 days and one day. On the other hand, the minimal duration observed in the 
sample is less than one day, and the maximum duration is 1.337 days (more than 3.5 years). The 
histogram of Figure 2 shows a clear decrease in frequency after the first week of duration of the job 
demand and, from there, a softer evolution with a decreasing trend
14. 
 
                                                 
14 For a clearer view of the figure, we represent durations of up to 500 days on the horizontal axis. The frequencies for 
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Duration of the job demand (days)
Figure 2. Distribution of the complete durations. Job demands.
 
                      Source: Our elaboration based on the sample.  
 
To conclude this section, we illustrate in Figure 3 the crossing of the durations corresponding 
to every vacancy and every worker who has formed a job placement
15. In this figure, a certain 
predominance of the vacancies that show a relatively short duration (for example, lower than 15 
days) is noted, whereas the durations of the job demands present a wider time range; this fact might 
constitute an indication of some degree of stock-flow matching in our data
16. The following section 




















































































0 15 30 45 60 75 90 105 120 135 150 165 180 195 210 225 240 255 270 285 300
Duration of the vacancy (days)
Figure 3. Duration of the vacancy and of the job demand in each job placement. 
 
                      Source: Our elaboration based on the sample.  
                                                 
15 We omit extreme durations, which are scarce, to present a clearer figure. 
16 Nevertheless, the matching observed between short-duration vacancies and job demands on the one hand and between 
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4. Estimations and results. Stock-flow test. 
 
Our sample is composed of 3.565 vacancies registered in the SAE between March 2006 and 
October 2008, of which 48,3% (1.722 vacancies) form a job placement; it means a daily hazard rate 
for the vacancy of 0,23%
17. 
 
From this sample, it is possible to design an empirical test that allows us to detect some 
evidence of stock-flow matching in our data. As we will show later, and unlike what happens in 
other works, the test that we propose is not based on information about all of the workers (stocks 
and flows) who are on the other side of the market trying to match in every period with our 
vacancies. 
 
Section 4 has three parts. In subsection 4.1, we obtain, by means of samples of vacancies and 
job demands, the Kaplan-Meier hazard rates. From these rates, we will estimate, by means of a test 
of structural change, the duration in days from which a vacancy (or a job demand) can be 
considered to belong to the long side of the market; that is, it belongs to a labour segment where 
they are relatively abundant in relation to the other side of the market. In subsection 4.2, we 
estimate, parametrically, the hazard rate of the SAE vacancies and analyse the observable 
heterogeneity. An interesting perspective of this analysis, apart from the study of the shape of the 
hazard rate, is that we can approach the detection of those sectors of the Andalusian labour market 
where the vacancies show the best or worst survival rates, which can be very useful for the 
employment policy. Finally, in subsection 4.3, we propose a test on the existence of a stock-flow 
framework in the matching process followed by the SAE vacancies. 
 
4.1. The Kaplan-Meier hazard rates: Maximum durations of "good" vacancies and "good" job 
demands. 
 
The fundamental hypothesis that we defend and test in this work is that if in the matching 
process that takes place across the Andalusian public employment offices some stock-flow 
dynamics is observed, the vacancies must be covered, less and less, in relative terms, with old or 
"bad" job demands when the vacancy matures, since duration is a sign that the vacancy is also 
"bad", that is, on the long side of the market
18. According to this, we might define old job demand 
as that which survives up to a certain temporary point and verify with our sample of vacancy 
durations whether the above mentioned hypothesis is satisfied
19. 
 
In this section, we suppose that a job demand becomes old when its hazard rate (which 
depends on the duration) experiences some change of regime that could make sense from the optics 
of the stock-flow model. Once the point at which the job demand becomes old is identified, if our 
above mentioned hypothesis is confirmed empirically, we will have demonstrated that the vacancies 
show certain stock-flow dynamics. 
 
We will follow Andrews et al. (2009) and name k
e and k
w to the time period that a new 
vacancy or a new job demand must exceed, respectively, to be considered old
20. Initially, these 
                                                 
17 To obtain this rate we have divided all of the matches that have taken place in the sample period (1.722) by the total 
number of days "at risk" of matching that have accumulated all the episodes of the vacancies in the sample 
(independently of whether they have been covered), a number that increases to 742.377 days; in other words, 742.377 
days (not overlapped) were needed to fill 1.722 of a total of 3.565 registered vacancies. 
18 Logically, the reasoning would be symmetrical for the side of the unemployed workers. 
19 The hypothesis will be fulfilled if there exists a stock-flow dynamics in our data of vacancies and if the job demand 
that we label as old is truly old (in terms of the model), in other words, if it is really a "bad" job demand, which is on the 
long side of the market. 
20 We define a duration threshold not only for the job demands but also for the vacancies. We do this to be able to make 
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authors choose the above mentioned thresholds of the duration of "ad hoc" form, since they take as 
initial values of k
e and k
w those that allow the maximisation of the matching between new and old 
individuals (subject to k
e= k
w), and later they fit those values, allowing them to differ
21, by means of 
the estimation of a duration model. In contrast to Andrews et al. (2009)
22, we propose the following 
method to determine the values of k
e and k
w: first, we will calculate the Kaplan-Meier hazard rates 
of both the vacancies and the job demands
23; and second, provided that the hazard rates are 
functions of the duration, we will try to identify by means of a Chow test some change of regime 
that is coherent with the prediction of the stock-flow model: when a worker (firm) checks all of the 
current possibilities of employment and does not manage to match, his hazard rate diminishes 




Figure 4 shows the non-parametric hazard rate for vacancies, bearing in mind that from 305 
days, we do not find any job placement. In this figure, an increasing trend of the hazard rate is 
observed during the first two weeks of duration of the vacancy; the trend later decreases, tending to 
zero. In other words, when a vacancy survives without coverage for more than two weeks, its 





























Duration of the vacancy (days)
Figure 4. Non-parametric hazard rate of the managed vacancies.
 
    Source: Our elaboration based on the sample.  
 
                                                 
21 As these authors point out, k
e and k
w do not have to coincide; for instance, it is plausible that k
e < k
w. 
22 The concrete method used for the determination of the duration thresholds k
e and k
w should not be a central element in 
this kind of analysis; however, we consider it important to demonstrate the validity of the chosen thresholds. In 
subsection 4.3, we will show the robustness of our results. 
23 To obtain the non-parametric hazard rate of job demands, we have used a different sample from the sample of 
vacancies analysed in this work. The job demands of the sample are registered in the SAE for the same period 
corresponding to the sample of vacancies (March 1, 2006-October 30, 2008). 
24 In practice, our data represent a matching scenario that is placed at some point between two pure theoretical extremes 
(random vs. stock-flow matching). Therefore, if our sample is closer to the stock-flow extreme, the empirically 
calculated stock-flow duration thresholds (k
e and k
w) are more heavily adjusted. On the other hand, to implement the 
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The Chow test gives a stock-flow break point in the hazard rate at the duration of 14 days: a 
vacancy that is placed on the short side of the market
25 (a "good" vacancy) should be covered in the 
first two weeks. The firm that offers the vacancy and the office of the SAE that manages it do not 
have any problems finding a suitable worker for that vacancy in the existing stock of job demands. 
On the other hand, if the new vacancy belongs to the long side in its segment of the market (a "bad" 
vacancy), then we expect that it will probably become an old vacancy, that is, it will remain without 
coverage for 15 or more days. In this case, the vacancy is not covered in the short term from the 
stock of available workers, and it will be necessary to wait for the entry of new candidates to cover 
it. 
 
Figure 5 represents the (raw and smoothed)
26 non-parametric hazard rate for job demands, 




























Duration of the job demand (days)
Figura 5. Non-parametric hazard rate of the managed job demands.
Hazard  rate
Smoothed  hazard  rate
 
 Source: Our elaboration based on the sample.  
 
Analogous to the case of the vacancies, though on a smaller scale, the hazard rate tends to 
increase during the first two weeks of duration; it then shows a decrease that is less pronounced 
than in the previous case. Consequently, it is more difficult to identify the stock-flow break point. In 
any case, the F-statistic of the Chow test reaches a maximum value for a duration of 22 days, and, 
analogous to the reasoning for the case of the vacancies, we suppose that a job demand with a 
duration of 23 days or more can be considered an old job demand; in this sense, we suppose that 
this job demand belongs to a segment of the labour market where the workers are on the long side, 
trying to match the new vacancies that are arriving. In the hazard rate of the vacancies and in that of 
the job demands, the point of break between new and old units does not have to coincide exactly 
with the maximum value of the function. This implies that a short-side vacancy or a short-side job 
demand can experience a decrease in its hazard rate in spite of its short duration; this may be a 
result of how the job offers and job demands are managed by public employment agencies. For 
instance, in the case of a "good" vacancy, we could observe that a few days are necessary to begin 
                                                 
25 Concretely, the vacancy is on the short side of its segment or sector in the labour market. That segment comes defined 
by the characteristics of the vacancy, in terms of the sector of activity, the group of occupation, etc. 
26 Due to the high variability in the hazard rate of the job demands, we have chosen to implement the test of structural 
change on the smoothed series –which were obtained following the method of Hodrick-Prescott (1997), using a 
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to really manage it, which explains the hazard rate increases in the first days of the duration; and 
once this vacancy has been covered, it takes one or more days until the job placement is fully 
registered
27, which would explain the decrease in this rate. 
 
4.2. Estimation of a duration model for the vacancies of the SAE.  
 
We now estimate a continuous
28 lognormal parametric model for the hazard rate of the 
vacancies
29. This model belongs to the accelerated failure-time type of models, where the estimated 
coefficients show the effect of unitary changes in the corresponding regressor on the time of 
survival, given the rest of characteristics. The explanatory variables that we introduce in the 
estimations are as follows: 
 
- Descriptive variables of the vacancy: the group of occupation, the sector of activity, whether the 
vacancy is public, whether it belongs to the PFEA (plan of promotion of the agrarian employment), 
the province of the vacancy, the type of contract and the size of the firm. These variables do not 
change with the duration of the vacancy. 
 
- Macroeconomic variable: the SAE registered unemployment rate during the sample period
30. This 
variable, which changes with the duration of the vacancy, measures the effect of the aggregate 
changes in the Andalusian labour market over the time period of survival.   
 
Table 1 shows the general estimation of the model for the hazard rate of vacancies. 
Concretely, the table presents the exponential of the estimated coefficients, which, in this type of 
model, corresponds to the ratio of the resultant time periods of survival in response to a unitary 
change in the value of a certain characteristic of the vacancy, maintaining everything else constant; 
this means, when dummy variables exist, we must compare every variable with the reference 
variable (the one that has not been included in the estimation). The model allows the existence of 
unobservable heterogeneity in the data
31, which is significant, even though the estimation controls 
several observable characteristics of the vacancies. 
 
We now comment on the results obtained. The estimated duration of a public vacancy in the 
SAE represents only 21,56% of that of a private vacancy, whereas a PFEA vacancy survives 
slightly less than 70% of the estimated duration for a vacancy that does not belong to that 
programme. On the other hand, the vacancies corresponding to a permanent contract last half as 
long as those of the fixed-term type. These results seem to indicate that in the SAE environment, 
workers show a preference for vacancies related to the public sector (PFEA or not) and for 
permanent contracts. 
                                                 
27 Until this operation is not carried out, the closure of the vacancy will not take place. 
28 We have chosen to use a specification in continuous time for the hazard rate of the vacancies due to the daily 
frequency of our data and because the mean duration of a vacancy is 208 days. In addition, two types of vacancies are 
censored to the right: those that remain open on the date of sample extraction and those that have been closed by 
different causes from the coverage. In the latter case, we suppose that if a vacancy is closed in the SAE without 
coverage, it does not imply necessarily that it has disappeared; rather, it implies that the SAE has abandoned its 
management. 
29 The lognormal specification allows a form of the hazard rate of the vacancies in accordance with the non-parametric 
hazard rate of Figure 4 (Jenkins, 2005). In addition, we have worked with other flexible specifications for the hazard 
function, as the loglogistic or the Cox semiparametric, obtaining similar results. 
30 This rate is the result of dividing the unemployed workers registered every month in the SAE by the Andalusian 
labour force of the corresponding quarter. That rate has been treated in daily terms by assigning the value of the rate in 
the corresponding month to every day. 
31 The model has been estimated without assigning any concrete value to the random variable that controls for 
unobservable individual effects. That variable has been introduced in the function of survival (and of likelihood) 
through the parameters that define its supposed distribution of probability, which, in our case, is the “gamma” 
distribution with mean 1 and unknown variance σ
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PFEA 0.6911 0.0896 -2.8500 0.0040 0.5360 0.8911
Public vacancy 0.2156 0.0392 -8.4400 0.0000 0.1510 0.3079
Permanent contract 0.4932 0.1094 -3.1900 0.0010 0.3193 0.7619
Agriculture 2.0947 0.4038 3.8400 0.0000 1.4357 3.0563
Trade, restaurants, transport, communications 0.2659 0.0548 -6.4300 0.0000 0.1776 0.3983
Industry 0.3366 0.0798 -4.5900 0.0000 0.2114 0.5357
Public services 1.3216 0.1393 2.6500 0.0080 1.0750 1.6248
Other services 0.4429 0.0847 -4.2600 0.0000 0.3045 0.6442
Financial services, services to companies 0.6073 0.2451 -1.2400 0.2170 0.2753 1.3397
Non-qualified manual worker 1.2585 0.1321 2.1900 0.0280 1.0245 1.5460
Qualified non-manual worker 0.4413 0.0838 -4.3100 0.0000 0.3041 0.6404
Non-qualified non-manual worker 1.5853 0.2411 3.0300 0.0020 1.1767 2.1358
Málaga 0.9005 0.1393 -0.6800 0.4980 0.6650 1.2194
Granada 3.0504 0.4263 7.9800 0.0000 2.3195 4.0117
Córdoba 0.4193 0.0596 -6.1100 0.0000 0.3173 0.5540
Huelva 1.0529 0.1845 0.2900 0.7690 0.7467 1.4845
Cádiz 0.7205 0.1065 -2.2200 0.0270 0.5392 0.9626
Jaén 0.6023 0.0840 -3.6300 0.0000 0.4582 0.7917
Almería 0.3304 0.0583 -6.2800 0.0000 0.2339 0.4668
Micro-firm 1.4421 0.1235 4.2800 0.0000 1.2193 1.7056
Medium firm 1.0594 0.1386 0.4400 0.6590 0.8198 1.3691
Big firm 0.8119 0.1390 -1.2200 0.2230 0.5805 1.1355
Registered unemployment rate 1.0685 0.0386 1.8300 0.0670 0.9954 1.1470
Ln_sigma 0.2127 0.0542 3.9200 0.0000 0.1064 0.3191
Ln_theta 0.8446 0.1177 7.1800 0.0000 0.6139 1.0753
Sigma 1.2371 0.0671 1.1123 1.3758
Theta 2.3271 0.2739 1.8477 2.9309
Table 1. Estimation of a duration model with "gamma" unobservable heterogeneity for the hazard rate of the vacancies.      
Log-normal regression. 
Number of observations: 3565. Number of transitions: 1722. Total of days "at risk" of matching: 742377.
"Dummy" variables omitted: Sevilla, small firm, qualified manual worker, construction
Log-likelihood = -4795,0141
 LR chi2(23) = 466,43; Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
LR test of theta = 0: chibar2(1) = 159.94; Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000
Confidence               
intervals (95%)
 Source: Our elaboration based on the sample. 
 
If we analyse the sector of activity of the vacancy, taking the construction as the reference, we 
observe that in agriculture and the public services sector, the estimated duration of a vacancy is 
higher
32, whereas the other sectors show better rates of coverage, especially in the case of trade, 
restaurants, transport and communications and in the case of industry. 
 
Grouped by occupation, the vacancies for qualified workers are those with lower duration, 
especially in the case of non-manual vacancies. 
 
With regard to the provinces, Almería, Córdoba and Jaén present lower rates of survival; in 
these provinces the public or PFEA vacancies have an important weight. The case of Granada is 
                                                 
32 This result seems strange, since in the sectors of the construction, the agriculture and the public services are most of 
the public and PFEA vacancies, which show relatively low rates of survival. The worst rates of survival in these sectors 
can then be due to the low hazard rates of the rest of vacancies, those that are not of a PFEA or public character. In this 
respect, for instance, of 145 PFEA vacancies that exist in the agriculture, 118 were covered, whereas of the 64 
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interesting, since it shows the highest rate of survival despite a high number of public vacancies -for 
example, the estimated duration of a vacancy in Granada trebles that in the case of Seville
33. 
 
If we look at the size of the firm, we observe that vacancies in big firms have a shorter 
duration -in other words, they are covered faster- with micro-firms needing more time to fill a 
vacancy. 
 
         Finally, in contrast to the expected result at the theoretical level in terms of the Beveridge 
curve, the rate of registered unemployment shows a positive though slightly significant effect on the 
rate of survival of the vacancies
34. This can be indicative of the fact that in the SAE, job placements 
depend on the registration of vacancies rather than on the volume of job demands (Álvarez de 
Toledo et al., 2008). 
 



























Duration of the vacancy (days)
Figure 6. Estimated hazard rate for a vacancy managed by the SAE. Log-normal regression.
 
    Source: Our elaboration based on the sample.  
 
As with the non-parametric hazard rate in Figure 4, the estimated hazard rate with the log-
normal model increases during the first weeks of duration, a period during which the "good" 
vacancies must be covered, and begins to decrease later, when the "good" vacancies are less 
abundant within the stock of vacancies. As we will see, this form of the hazard rate is a necessary 
(but not sufficient) condition for the existence of a stock-flow environment.  
 
                                                 
33 According to our sample data, the percentage of coverage of the public vacancies in Granada is relatively small. 
34 We have also implemented the estimation replacing the variable "registered unemployment rate" with the variable 
"DENOS rate" (DENOS is a wider category that includes all of the non-employed job seekers registered in the SAE), 
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4.3. Estimation of a duration model with multiple exits for SAE vacancies: testing the stock-
flow model. 
 
Once we know the respective thresholds of duration that determine whether a job demand and 
a vacancy become old, we can calculate the average hazard rates of the vacancies in each of the 
resultant segments of duration (Table 2); see also Andrews et al. (2009). 
 
“New” vacancies  “Old” vacancies  Total 
Total of days without matching. Non-covered vacancies  203 674414 674617
Total of days without matching. Covered vacancies  6555 59483 66038
Matching with a “new” job demand  178 217 395
Matching with an “old” job demand  630 697 1327
Total of days “at risk” of matching  7566 734811 742377
Table 2. Classification of the matching depending on the durations (k
e = 14, k
w = 22).
    
 Source: Our elaboration based on the sample.  
 
The 1.722 job placements are disaggregated in Table 2 attending to the duration of the 
vacancy and that of the job demand, considering k
e=14 and  k
w=22. Consequently, we obtain 4 
types of matching: 
 
- m11: new job demand with new vacancy, which represents 10,3% of the job placements. 
- m12: new job demand with old vacancy (12,6%). 
- m21: old job demand with new vacancy (36,6%). 
- m22: old job demand with old vacancy (40,5%). 
 
The mean hazard rates of the vacancies in every category can be obtained by dividing the total 




11 = 178 / 7566 = 0,023. 
- h
e
12 = 217 / 734811 = 0,0003. 
- h
e
21 = 630 / 7566 = 0,083. 
- h
e
22 = 697 / 734811 = 0,0009. 
 
The notable decrease observed in the hazard rate of vacancies in Figure 4 can be decomposed 
in two facts: 1º) The hazard or risk of matching of a vacancy with a new job demand decreases from 
0,023 to 0,0003 when the vacancy becomes old. 2º) The hazard of matching of a vacancy with an 
old job demand decreases from 0,083 to 0,0009 when the vacancy becomes old. 
 
The fact that both hazard rates, those towards new job demands and those towards old job 
demands, decrease with duration of the vacancy could be unexpected from the point of view of the 
stock-flow model, which only predicts a decreased hazard rate when the transitions are towards old 
job demands. However, other factors, apart from the stock-flow framework, explain the decrease of 
both rates, such as the permanence in the stock of managed vacancies, period after period, of 
fictitious vacancies of administrative character
35. Therefore, we suggest that the existence of certain 
evidence in favour of the stock-flow model in our data cannot rest totally on the second fact 
observed (that h
e
21 is higher than h
e
22). In addition, the fact that when the vacancies are new, the 
hazard rate towards old job demands (h
e
21) is higher than the hazard rate towards new job demands 
(h
e
11) does not suppose a clear indication of stock-flow hypothesis, since, for every duration of the 
vacancy, the volume of old demands "at risk" of matching is considerably higher than the volume of 
new demands. 
                                                 
35 If the stock of vacancies is running out of those with real matching options, with only the problematic vacancies  
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Taking into account all of these problems, the testing hypothesis that we formulate in this 
work is as follows: if there exists some degree of stock-flow matching in our data, the ratio of 
"hazard rate of the vacancies towards old job demands / hazard rate of the vacancies towards new 
job demands" should decrease with the duration of the vacancy. If this happens, we can affirm that 
matching towards old job demands becomes less important compared with matching towards new 
job demands with the duration of the vacancy, as predicted by the stock-flow model. From another 
perspective, under a random matching scheme, where the lack of information -among other 
frictions- forces all of the firms and all of the workers to search randomly in every period, the 
maturing of a vacancy does not determine its exit towards an old or a new job demand. 
 








12 = 3”, 
certain evidence in favour of the stock-flow matching is obtained, since the exits of the vacancies 
towards old job demands become less important when the vacancy becomes old. This conclusion 
should be taken cautiously, since other characteristics or heterogeneities might exist in the 
vacancies, apart from the stock-flow scheme, that explain the above mentioned result. To control 
for the possible existence of heterogeneity in the vacancies, both observable and unobservable, we 
proceed to estimate a duration model, which considers two types of matching or successful exits for 
the vacancies: towards new job demands (those with duration lower than 23 days) and towards old 
job demands (those with durations greater than 22 days). If the estimation shows that, after 
controlling for heterogeneity, the ratio of the hazard rates (towards old job demands and towards 
new job demands) decreases with the duration of the vacancy, then we can affirm that we have 
found evidence in favour of stock-flow matching. This type of methodology can be also very 
interesting for organising employment policies directed towards specific groups of workers, 
classified depending on the duration of their job demands. The results are presented in Table 3. 
 
The first thing we observe in this table is that a higher relative speed of coverage of the PFEA 
vacancies mainly affects the exits towards old job demands, which seems to indicate that those 
vacancies are fundamentally destined for the high-duration job demands. However, this does not 
happen with the public vacancies in general, which, in spite of including the PFEA vacancies, show 
a relatively lower rate of survival if the transition of the vacancies is towards new job demands. For 
the case of permanent contract, the rate of survival is relatively lower when the exits are towards 
new job demands, although the variable is not very significant in this case. 
 
At the sectoral level, important differences between the estimations are not observed; that is, 
the agriculture, construction and public services sectors show higher probabilities of survival than 
the other sectors. Nevertheless, a lower rate of survival in the industry of those vacancies that are 
covered with new job demands is observed. Grouping by occupation, the vacancies of higher 
qualification (qualified non-manual group) are filled faster towards new job demands. 
 
Therefore, it is observed that public vacancies (but not PFEA), with a permanent contract, in 
the industrial sector and calling for high-level skills find suitable candidates between the new job 
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PFEA 0.9761 0.3802 -0.0600 0.9500 0.4549 2.0945 0.6813 0.0829 -3.1500 0.0020 0.5368 0.8648
Public vacancy 0.1225 0.0463 -5.5600 0.0000 0.0585 0.2568 0.4692 0.0768 -4.6200 0.0000 0.3404 0.6468
Permanent contract 0.4858 0.3000 -1.1700 0.2420 0.1448 1.6297 0.5117 0.1127 -3.0400 0.0020 0.3322 0.7881
Agriculture 2.7071 1.2714 2.1200 0.0340 1.0783 6.7965 2.5772 0.4620 5.2800 0.0000 1.8137 3.6622
Trade, restaurants, transp., comm. 0.3215 0.1525 -2.3900 0.0170 0.1269 0.8145 0.3470 0.0728 -5.0400 0.0000 0.2300 0.5237
Industry 0.3235 0.1814 -2.0100 0.0440 0.1078 0.9707 0.6303 0.1436 -2.0300 0.0430 0.4032 0.9852
Public services 1.8504 0.4877 2.3300 0.0200 1.1039 3.1018 1.2100 0.1141 2.0200 0.0430 1.0058 1.4557
Other services 0.5532 0.2334 -1.4000 0.1610 0.2419 1.2649 0.5217 0.1054 -3.2200 0.0010 0.3511 0.7753
Financial services, serv. companies 0.3185 0.3164 -1.1500 0.2490 0.0455 2.2315 0.7087 0.2697 -0.9000 0.3660 0.3362 1.4943
Non-qualified manual worker 0.7815 0.2036 -0.9500 0.3440 0.4690 1.3024 1.3945 0.1401 3.3100 0.0010 1.1452 1.6981
Qualified non-manual worker 0.2296 0.0996 -3.3900 0.0010 0.0981 0.5373 0.6381 0.1221 -2.3500 0.0190 0.4385 0.9286
Non-qualified non-manual worker 1.5689 0.5424 1.3000 0.1930 0.7968 3.0892 1.1980 0.1821 1.1900 0.2350 0.8893 1.6139
Málaga 1.4466 0.5086 1.0500 0.2940 0.7262 2.8815 0.6872 0.1023 -2.5200 0.0120 0.5132 0.9201
Granada 5.5581 1.9052 5.0000 0.0000 2.8389 10.8818 1.9461 0.2681 4.8300 0.0000 1.4856 2.5494
Córdoba 0.5389 0.1778 -1.8700 0.0610 0.2822 1.0289 0.4308 0.0557 -6.5100 0.0000 0.3344 0.5551
Huelva 1.4733 0.6019 0.9500 0.3430 0.6616 3.2812 0.9292 0.1585 -0.4300 0.6670 0.6652 1.2981
Cádiz 2.3828 0.8769 2.3600 0.0180 1.1584 4.9015 0.5734 0.0808 -3.9500 0.0000 0.4351 0.7558
Jaén 1.0258 0.3388 0.0800 0.9390 0.5369 1.9599 0.5477 0.0704 -4.6800 0.0000 0.4257 0.7047
Almería 0.6541 0.2589 -1.0700 0.2830 0.3011 1.4209 0.2305 0.0401 -8.4400 0.0000 0.1640 0.3242
Micro-firm 1.4567 0.2966 1.8500 0.0650 0.9773 2.1712 1.2789 0.1009 3.1200 0.0020 1.0956 1.4928
Medium firm 1.2388 0.3918 0.6800 0.4980 0.6665 2.3027 1.0331 0.1231 0.2700 0.7850 0.8179 1.3049
Big firm 0.6095 0.2757 -1.0900 0.2740 0.2512 1.4792 0.9897 0.1499 -0.0700 0.9450 0.7354 1.3318
Registered unemployment rate 1.0231 0.0915 0.2600 0.7980 0.8586 1.2192 1.0876 0.0348 2.6200 0.0090 1.0214 1.1581
Ln_sigma 0.5599 0.1349 4.1500 0.0000 0.2955 0.8244 -0.0861 0.0537 -1.6000 0.1090 -0.1914 0.0191
Ln_theta 2.5194 0.2632 9.5700 0.0000 2.0036 3.0352 1.6401 0.0811 20.2200 0.0000 1.4811 1.7991
Sigma 1.7506 0.2362 1.3438 2.2805 0.9174611 0.0492487 0.8258396 1.019247
Theta 12.4212 3.269021 7.415556 20.80575 5.155794 0.4181845 4.397997 6.044163
Confidence intervals (95%)
Dummy variables omitted: Sevilla, small firm, qualified manual worker, construction
 LR chi2(23) = 137,92; Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
LR test of theta = 0: chibar2(1) = 36,39; Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000
Dummy variables omitted: Sevilla, small firm, qualified manual worker, construction
LR test of theta = 0: chibar2(1) = 196,86; Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000
Number of observations: 3565. Num. of transitions: 395. Total of days "at risk" of matching: 742377 Number of observations: 3565. Num. of transitions: 1327. Total of days "at risk" of matching: 742377
Exit towards a "new" job demand (22 days or less)
Table 3. Estimation of a duration model with "gamma" unobservable heterogeneity for the hazard rate of the vacancies. Log-normal regression. Multiple exits (k
w=22).
Log-likelihood = -1723,24 Log-likelihood = -3941,78
 LR chi2(23) = 370,75; Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Exit towards an "old" job demand (more than 22 days)
Confidence intervals (95%)
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For the Andalusian provinces, exempting the cases of Granada and Cádiz, which are relatively 
worse, important differences between Seville and the rest of the provinces are not observed when 
the transitions are towards new job demands -if the reduced significance of the coefficients is taken 
into account. However, almost all provinces improve their positions in comparison with Seville 
when the transitions are towards old job demands, especially Granada and Cádiz, although Granada 
continues in a worse position. 
 
According to the size of the firm, we only observe clearly the worst relative position of the 
micro-firm in comparison with the other sizes of firms, independent of the type of exit. 
 
Finally, the Andalusian registered unemployment rate shows a positive and significant effect 
on the probability of survival for a vacancy that matches with an old job demand; this fact points 
towards the existence of a labour imbalance or a mismatch between the vacancies and the job 
demands that mature in the stock. 
 
The estimations of the hazard rate of the vacancies according to the exit (left axis) and the 






























































Duration of the vacancy (days)
Figure 7. Hazard rates of the managed vacancies depending on the exit (kw=22). Log-normal 
regression. Ratio of the hazard rates
Hazard rate towards "new" job demands
Hazard rate towards "old" job demands
Hazard rate towards "old" job demands / Hazard rate towards "new" job demands
  
 Source: Our elaboration based on the sample. 
 
Both rates show a negative dependence on duration after approximately the first two weeks of 
the duration of the vacancy, with the hazard rate towards old demands consistently being higher, 
especially when the vacancies are new. The ratio between both rates decreases when the vacancy 
increases its duration, which from our point of view indicates the existence of stock-flow dynamics 
in the vacancies managed by the SAE: when a vacancy of the SAE is becoming old, the probability 
of transition towards a new job demand is reinforced to the detriment of the probability of transition 
towards an old job demand. 
 
To complete our analysis, we now check the robustness of our results. In this sense, we 
analyse what happens with the above mentioned ratio of hazard rates of the vacancies if we use 
alternative durations to consider that a job demand has become old. If k
w tends to infinity, when the 
vacancies mature should diminish their relative rate of matching with the job demands that we 
consider old, since that vacancy and that worker have coexisted for a long period of time without 
matching. However, if k
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their relative hazard rate with the job demands that we consider old because those workers have 
only been in the market for a short period of time, coexisting with the stock of old vacancies; even 
that relative probability might increase. The following figure shows the normalised ratio of those 



























































Duration of the vacancy (days)
Figure 8. Normalized estimations of the "hazard rate towards "old" job demands / hazard rate 
towards "new " job demands" for different durations of the job demand. Log-normal regression
Job demand is "old" from 5 days
Job demand is "old" from 14 days
Job demand is "old" from 22 days
Job demand is "old" from 100 days
Job demand is "old" from 365 days
 
     Source: Our elaboration based on the sample.  
 
  If we consider a job demand to be old when it has only been 5 days "at risk" of matching, 
the ratio of the hazard rates does not behave like the stock-flow model predicts, since the above-
mentioned ratio, instead of decreasing, increases with the duration of the vacancy. This is indicative 
that not all of the "good" job demands have access to the other side of the market and a job 
placement in less than 6 days; consequently, a fraction of the job demands of more than 5 days of 
duration corresponds to "good" job demands, which will go towards old vacancies. In conclusion, 
the threshold of 5 days is not calibrated to measure the maximum duration of a "good" job demand. 
Later, we slightly increase the threshold of duration for an old job demand, but without reaching 22 
days; concretely, we consider k
w=14. In this case, we obtain a ratio of the hazard rates that is very 
flat but shows a certain negative slope for the high durations of the vacancy, which points to the 
existence of a stock-flow framework, but only of the weak form. Finally, if we consider as old the 
job demands that survive several months without matching (for example, 100 or 365 days), a clear 
decrease in the ratio of the hazard rates is observed, which is reasonable if we consider that in this 




The present work attempts to explain the main characteristics of the matching process of the 
vacancies registered in the offices of the SAE and to determine the characteristics of the vacancies 
that result in a job placement with higher and lower duration. In addition, our work proposes a new 
method to test whether the matching process of the vacancies managed by the SAE follows a stock-
flow framework. According to the stock-flow model, the vacancies that are registered in a 
marketplace (with complete information about the existing candidates) have to be separated into 
two groups: those that are "good" and are covered quickly because we find many workers in the 
stock of candidates interested in filling them and those that are "bad" and are not covered quickly 
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for the arrival of a new suitable candidate to fill the vacancy. It is possible to apply the same 
reasoning to the workers, distinguishing between "good" and "bad" job demands. If the above-
mentioned theoretical framework operates in a certain degree in the SAE and the duration that 
separates a "good" worker from a "bad" one is identified correctly, the ratio between the hazard rate 
of the vacancies towards old job demands vs. towards new job demands should decrease when the 
vacancy increases its time period of survival, since this longer survival signifies a lack of suitable 
candidates for the vacancy in the existing stock of workers, being more likely the transition towards 
a job demand recently registered, which would abandon quickly the search. To implement our test, 
the estimation of duration models for the hazard rate of the vacancies while considering the 
possibility of multiple exits is necessary; in addition, in these estimations, we tackle the existence of 
observable and unobservable heterogeneity. With all of these methodological elements, our work 
applies the state-of-the-art components of the main contributions in this field at the international 
level. Although our case study is interesting, because Andalusia has a special labour market that has 
received a lot of attention, we also think that the application of this type of analysis to other 
economies could be a fruitful line of future research.   
 
The main results obtained in our work are as follows: 
 
The vacancies managed by the SAE with a lower rate of survival present the following 
characteristics: they belong mainly to the public sector, are linked to permanent contracts, belong to 
the sectors of industry and to services in general, concern qualified workers, especially non-manual 
or "white collar" workers, are registered in the provinces of Almería, Córdoba or Jaén, and are 
offered by medium-sized or large firms. On the contrary, the vacancies showing greater difficulty in 
coverage are in private companies, are linked to fixed-term contracts, belong to the agricultural 
sector, are related to workers with low qualifications, are registered in the province of Granada, and 
are offered by micro-firms. 
 
The empirical methodology that we propose in this work shows certain evidence in favour of 
the stock-flow matching model. First, we observe that a "good" vacancy is covered in the SAE 
within approximately two weeks, whereas a "good" job demand does not last more than three 
weeks. Our estimations show that, with the independence of the characteristics of the vacancy, 
when a vacancy matures, its exit towards a "good" job demand is relatively more likely, since when 
the vacancies and the "at risk" workers coexist, period after period, their matching is increasingly 
less likely. In this labour market environment, a worker who does not find a suitable vacancy, not 
for lack of search intensity but because the vacancy does not exist in the current stock, should not 
be "sanctioned" with the reduction or elimination of his unemployment subsidy; rather, it would be 
necessary to transform the type of payment to develop geographical mobility and the recycling of 
workers with the aim of improving their overall employability, which will allow them to escape 
from the queues of workers (Álvarez de Toledo et al., 2008). In this respect, the programme of 
personalised itineraries of insertion to employment of the SAE could be a useful tool. In conclusion, 
we point to the active labour market policies -see Usabiaga (2007) and Gómez et al. (2009). We 
also have the possibility, recently opened in Spain, of transforming unemployment subsidies into 
subsidies for permanent contract hiring -on employment vouchers, see Orszag and Snower (2000). 
 
Finally, we believe that the SAE would improve its matching results with a decrease in the 
imbalance in preferences and characteristics that seems to exist between registered job offers and 
job demands. We are currently working in this field to detect imbalances for very specific segments 
of the overall SAE labour market. In this sense, the SAE or, in general, the Andalusian government, 
by means of industrial location/organisation policies, should promote the registration of "good" 
(short-side) vacancies, which are attractive for existing unemployed workers, and, to a lesser extent, 
incorporate workers who could fill the "bad" (long-side) vacancies through such actions as 
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labour flexibility of immigrants is the key factor in explaining the best behaviour observed in the 
Spanish Phillips curve during the period 1995-2006 (which consisted of unemployment reduction 
without inflation pressure). 
 
References. 
Ahn, N. and Ugidos, A. (1995): “Duration of Unemployment in Spain: Relative Effects of 
Unemployment Benefit and Family Characteristics”, Oxford Bulletin of  Economics and 
Statistics, 57 (2), pp. 249-264. 
Ahn, N., De la Rica, S. and Ugidos, A. (1999): “Willingness to Move for Work and Unemployment 
Duration in Spain”, Economica, 66 (263), pp. 335-357. 
Alba-Ramírez, A. (1994): “Self-Employment in the Midst of Unemployment: The Case of Spain 
and the United States”, Applied Economics, 26 (3), pp. 189-204. 
Alba-Ramírez, A. (1998): “Re-employment Probabilities of Young Workers in Spain”, 
Investigaciones Económicas, 22 (2), pp. 201-224. 
Alba-Ramírez, A. (1999): “Explaining the Transitions of Unemployment in Spain: The Effect of 
Unemployment Insurance”, Applied Economics, 31 (2), pp. 183-193. 
Alba-Ramírez, A., Arranz, J. and Muñoz-Bullón, F. (2007): “Exits from Unemployment: Recall or 
New Job”, Labour Economics, 14 (5), pp. 788-810. 
Albert, C., Toharia, L. and Davia, M. (2008): “To Find or Not to Find a First "Significant" Job”, 
Revista de Economía Aplicada, XVI (46), pp. 37-59. 
Álvarez de Toledo, P., Núñez, F. and Usabiaga, C. (2008): “La Función de Emparejamiento en el 
Mercado de Trabajo Español”, Revista de Economía Aplicada, XVI (48), pp. 5-35. 
Andrés, J., García, J. and Jiménez, S. (1989): “La Incidencia y la Duración del Desempleo 
Masculino en España”, Moneda y Crédito, 189, pp. 75-124. 
Andrews, M., Bradley, S., Stott, D. and Upward, R. (2008): “Successful Employer Search? An 
Empirical Analysis of Vacancy Duration Using Micro Data”, Economica, 75 (299), pp. 455-
480. 
Andrews, M., Bradley, S., Stott, D. and Upward, R. (2009): “Testing Theories of Labour Market 
Matching”, University of Manchester, School of Economics, mimeo. 
Arranz, J. and Muro, J. (2007): “Duration Data Models, Unemployment Benefits and Bias”, Applied 
Economics Letters, 14 (15), pp. 1119-1122. 
Bentolila, S., Dolado, J.J. and Jimeno, J.F. (2008): “Does Immigration Affect the Phillips Curve? 
Some Evidence for Spain”, European Economic Review, 52 (8), pp. 1398-1423. 
Blanchard, O.J. and Diamond, P. (1994): “Ranking, Unemployment Duration, and Wages”, Review 
of Economic Studies, 61 (3), pp. 417-434. 
Bover, O. and Gómez, R. (2004): “Another Look at Unemployment Duration: Exit to a Permanent 
vs. a Temporary Job”, Investigaciones Económicas, 28 (2), pp. 285-314. 
Bover, O., Arellano, M. and Bentolila, S. (2002): “Unemployment Duration, Benefit Duration, and 
the Business Cycle”, Economic Journal, 112 (479), pp. 223-265. 
Burdett, K., Coles, M.G. and Van Ours, J.C. (1994): “Temporal Aggregation Bias in Stock-Flow 
Models”, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), Discussion Paper 967. 
Carrasco, R. (1999): “Transitions To and From Self-Employment in Spain: An Empirical Analysis”, 
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 61 (3), pp. 315-341. 
Cebrián, I. and Toharia, L. (2008): “La Entrada en el Mercado de Trabajo. Un Análisis Basado en la 
MCVL”, Revista de Economía Aplicada, XVI (E-1), pp. 137-172. 
Coles, M.G. (1994): “Understanding the Matching Function: The Role of Newspapers and Job 
Agencies”, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), Discussion Paper 939. 
Coles, M.G. and Petrongolo, B. (2008): “A Test Between Unemployment Theories Using Matching 
Data”, International Economic Review, 49 (4), pp. 1113-1141. 
Coles, M.G. and Smith, E. (1998): “Marketplaces and Matching”, International Economic Review, 







   21
Cueto, B. and Mato, J. (2006): “An Analysis of Self-employment Subsidies with Duration Models”, 
Applied Economics, 38 (1), pp. 23-32. 
Fernández, C. (2006): “The Role of Education vis-à-vis Job Experience in Explaining the 
Transitions to Employment in the Spanish Youth Labour Market”, Spanish Economic Review,  
8 (3), pp. 161-187 
García-Pérez, J.I. (1997): “Las Tasas de Salida del Empleo y del Desempleo en España (1978-
1993)”, Investigaciones Económicas, 21 (1), pp. 29-53. 
García-Pérez, J.I. (2006): “Job Separation in a Non-Stationary Search Model: A Structural 
Estimation to Evaluate Alternative Unemployment Insurance Systems”, Journal of Applied 
Econometrics, 21 (2), pp. 245-272. 
Gómez, F., Romero-Ávila, D. and Usabiaga, C. (2009): “El Mercado de Trabajo”. In: Vallés, J. 
(Dir.): Economía Española (second edition), McGraw-Hill, Madrid, pp. 301-330.   
Gonzalo, M.T. (2002): “A New Look at the UI Effect on Transitions from Unemployment into 
Wage Employment in Spain: The Limited Duration of the UI Benefits Entitlement”, Applied 
Economics, 34 (17), pp. 2177-2187. 
Gregg, P. and Petrongolo, B. (2005): “Stock-Flow Matching and the Performance of the Labor 
Market”, European Economic Review, 49 (8), pp. 1987-2011. 
Güell, M. and Hu, L. (2006): “Estimating the Probability of Leaving Unemployment Using 
Uncompleted Spells from Repeated Cross-Section Data”, Journal of Econometrics, 133 (1), 
pp. 307-341. 
Güell, M. and Petrongolo, B. (2007): “How Binding are Legal Limits? Transitions from Temporary 
to Permanent Work in Spain”, Labour Economics, 14 (2), pp. 153-183. 
Ham, J. and Rea, S. (1987): “Unemployment Insurance and Male Unemployment Duration in 
Canada”, Journal of Labor Economics, 5 (3), pp. 325-353. 
Hodrick, R.J. and Prescott, E.C. (1997): “Postwar U.S. Business Cycles: An Empirical 
Investigation”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 29 (1), pp. 1-16. 
Jenkins, S.P. (2005): Survival Analysis, Lecture Notes, Institute for Social and Economic Research, 
Essex. 
Jenkins, S.P. and García-Serrano, C. (2004): “The Relationship between Unemployment Benefits 
and Re-employment Probabilities: Evidence from Spain”, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and 
Statistics, 66 (2), pp. 239-260. 
Katz, F. and Meyer, D. (1990): “The Impact of the Potential Duration of Unemployment Benefits 
on the Duration of Unemployment”, Journal of Public Economics, 41 (1), pp. 45-72. 
Kiefer, N. (1988): “Economic Duration Data and Hazard Functions”, Journal of Economic 
Literature, 26 (2), pp. 646-679. 
Lancaster, T. (1990): The Econometric Analysis of Transition Data, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
Lassibille, G., Navarro, L., Aguilar, I. and Sánchez, C. (2001): “Youth Transition from School to 
Work in Spain”, Economics of Education Review, 20 (2), pp. 139-149. 
Meyer, B. (1990): “Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Spells”, Econometrica, 58 (4), 
pp. 757-782. 
Narendranathan, W. and Stewart, B. (1993): “How Does the Benefit Effect Vary as Unemployment 
Spells Lengthen?”, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 8 (4), pp. 361-381. 
Nickell, S. (1979): “Estimating the Probability of Leaving Unemployment”, Econometrica, 47 (5), 
pp. 1249-1266. 
Núñez, F. and Usabiaga, C. (2007): La Curva de Beveridge y la Función de Emparejamiento: 
Revisión de Sus Fundamentos Teóricos y de la Literatura Empírica, con Especial Énfasis en 
el Caso Español, Centro de Estudios Andaluces, Seville. 
Orszag, J.M. and Snower, D.J. (2000): “The Effectiveness of Employment Vouchers: A Simple 
Approach”, German Economic Review, 1 (4), pp. 385-419. 
Salas-Velasco, M. (2007): “The Transition from Higher Education to Employment in Europe: The 







   22
Usabiaga, C. (2004): El Diferencial de Desempleo Andaluz. Análisis Macroeconómico del Mercado 
de Trabajo Andaluz en Comparación con el del Resto de España (1980-2000), Aconcagua, 
Seville. 
Usabiaga, C. (2007): “La Reforma del Mercado de Trabajo: El Caso Español”, Papeles  de                 
Economía Española, 111, pp. 177-197. 
 
 
 
 
 
http://www.upo.es/econ 
 